苏州市古村落保护办法
江苏省苏州市人民政府
苏州市古村落保护办法
苏州市人民政府令
第 83 号
《苏州市古村落保护办法》已经2005年6月8日市政府第44次常务会议讨论通过，现予发布。
市长 阎立
2005年6月8日
苏州市古村落保护办法
第一条 为了加强对古村落的保护，维护古村落传统风貌，继承优秀历史文化遗产，根据有关法律、法规的规定，结合本市实际，制定本办法。
第二条 本办法所称古村落，是指具备下列条件的农村村民居住和从事各种生产的聚居点：
（一）村落形成于1911年以前，传统风貌与格局具有特色，传统街巷及两侧古建筑保存较为完整；
（二）文物古迹比较丰富，有10处以上1911年以前形成的民居、祠堂、寺庙、义庄、会馆、牌坊、桥梁、驳岸、古井、古文化遗址、古墓葬及近现代重要史迹、优秀建筑；
（三）具有传统风貌的河道水系、地貌遗迹,古树名木等；
（四）具有地方特色的民族民间传统文化。
具备前款条件的村落，由市文物、规划、建设行政主管部门组织专家评审后，报市人民政府审定并公布为苏州市控制保护古村落。
第三条 市和县级市、区人民政府负责本行政区域内的古村落保护，应当将古村落保护纳入本地区国民经济和社会发展规划。
古村落所在地镇人民政府（街道办事处，下同）负责本辖区内的古村落的日常管理和具体保护项目的实施。古村落较多的镇人民政府应当设立古村落保护管理机构。
第四条 市和县级市、区文物行政主管部门负责对古村落的文物保护工作实施管理、监督和指导。
市和县级市、区规划行政主管部门负责对古村落的规划保护工作实施管理、监督和指导。
市和县级市、区建设行政主管部门负责对古村落的建设保护工作实施管理、监督和指导。
发展改革、财政、旅游、园林绿化、水务、国土、环保、公安、城管、工商、房管等部门，按照各自职责，做好古村落保护工作。
第五条 古村落的保护，应当坚持统筹规划、有效保护、合理利用、科学管理的原则。
第六条 古村落所在地人民政府和文物、教育、新闻出版、广播电视等部门应当做好古村落保护的宣传教育工作。
第七条 古村落所在地镇人民政府应当配合县级市、区相关行政主管部门做好古村落内文物古迹、古树名木、河道水系、地貌遗迹等古村落资源的普查工作。普查结果应当登记造册，按照有关法律法规规定公布，并设立保护标志。
第八条 古村落所在地县级市、区人民政府应当在古村落公布后两年内组织编制完成保护规划，经市文物、规划、建设、环保行政主管部门共同审核后，报市人民政府批准，纳入城镇总体规划。
古村落所在地人民政府在实施古村落保护性修复工程前，应当编制修建性详细规划，并进行公示，征求公众意见。
第九条 古村落保护规划应当明确古村落的规模和发展方向，合理布局各区块功能，保持古村落的传统风貌和历史文化气息。
古村落规划保护范围内的土地利用和各项建设，必须符合古村落保护规划的要求。
第十条 编制古村落保护规划，应当根据古村落的历史遗存和现实情况，划定重点保护区和风貌协调区。重点保护区内不得进行与保护无关的建设工程。
古村落内新建建筑的高度、形式、体量、色彩等必须与古村落的历史风貌相协调，建设、规划行政主管部门在审批前，应当征求当地文物行政主管部门的意见。
第十一条 古村落的保护内容主要是：
（一）具有特色的整体空间环境和风貌；
（二）传统的街巷格局和形态；
（三）具有文物价值的古文化遗址、古建筑（构筑）物、石刻、近现代优秀建筑等；
（四）地下文物埋藏区；
（五）河道水系、地貌遗迹、古树名木等；
（六）具有地方特色的方言、传统戏曲、传统工艺、传统产业、民风民俗等文化遗产。
第十二条 各级人民政府应当在每年的财政预算中安排一定的资金专门用于古村落的保护，并随着财政收入的增长而增加。
古村落旅游开发的门票收入和其他旅游收入中，每年应当安排一定的比例用于古村落的保护。
镇人民政府应当在土地拍卖所得中，安排一定比例用于古村落的保护。对古村落较多的镇，市人民政府可以安排专项土地拍卖指标用于古村落保护。
第十三条 古村落所在村村民委员会负责下列工作：
（一）宣传古村落保护的相关法律法规，参与制定古村落保护规划，并监督其实施；
（二）组织制定村规民约，指导、督促村民按照古村落保护要求，合理使用古建筑；
（三）配合有关部门做好文物古迹、古树名木等古村落资源的普查工作；
（四）可以对有意转让的古建筑进行储备；
（五）对有损毁危险而无力维修的古建筑进行登记，并及时上报；
（六）合理开发利用古村落资源；
（七）组织专兼职消防队伍，明确消防职责和任务；
（八）对违反古村落保护的行为，进行制止，责令改正，对拒不改正者，及时提请有关部门处理。
第十四条 古村落内的古建筑，其保护管理责任人可以依法委托古建筑所在地镇人民政府或者村民委员会统一使用管理，履行保护管理责任。
第十五条 古村落村民应当保持古村落整体风貌，并合理享有古村落保护开发的收益。
古建筑的责任人应当保持古建筑的完好，不得擅自改变古建筑的使用性质。经统一规划，可以在古建筑内生产或者销售有地方特色的食品、工艺品等。
第十六条 古村落的传统街巷风貌整治和立面改造方案，应当符合古村落保护规划，并征求当地文物行政主管部门意见。
古村落内村民新建、改建、扩建房屋，应当符合古村落保护规划，其方案由村民委员会组织公示。
古村落重点保护区内原有与风貌不协调的建筑应当逐步整治或者拆除。
第十七条 古村落内的古建筑和石道板、井圈、古牌坊、古桥梁、古砖刻门楼等古构筑物、古建筑构件不得擅自拆除或者迁移。确需迁移或拆除的，必须征得当地文物行政主管部门同意后，报规划行政主管部门批准，拆除的古建筑构件不得出售，应当报请当地文物行政主管部门处理。
第十八条 古村落内的建筑装饰、装修必须符合下列规定：
（一）保持传统的色彩，以黑、白、灰为主色调；
（二）工艺上采用传统的砖雕、木雕、石雕；
（三）沿传统街巷建筑表层的门窗应当为木制，踏步应当使用石质材料，应当采用传统做法；
（四）护栏、店堂招牌、字号、临街广告应当与传统风貌相协调。
第十九条 古村落应当保持自然生态环境，周围山体应当绿化，河道应当定期清淤整治。
古村落不得新建架空线路，已有架空线路应当自古村落公布之日起五年内由相关部门逐步地埋、内设。
第二十条 古村落应当保持原有的生活状态，适度发展旅游和文化产业，防止无序和过度开发。
第二十一条 古村落的旅游开发，可以采取股份制的形式，村民以其所有的古建筑租赁或入股，同时吸收社会资金入股，参与古村落的保护、经营和收益。
国有资产、国有控股公司应当优先投资保护古村落。
社会资金参与古村落保护的，可以参照《苏州市区古建筑抢修贷款贴息和奖励办法》进行奖励。
第二十二条 对因古村落保护需要迁出古建筑的村民，可以参照房屋拆迁补偿或者征地拆迁补偿的有关规定执行。
对因无力维修而自愿把古建筑转让给村民委员会的村民，可以另行安置。
第二十三条 古村落内应当安装公共消防设施，主要街巷应当设置消防栓，古建筑应当配置消防器材。
第二十四条 古建筑内不得举行危害古建筑安全的活动。
古建筑不得作为柴草、煤气罐等易燃、易爆物品的堆放储备场所。
古建筑使用的电气线路应当穿管保护，线径、用电负荷应当与建筑的使用性质相匹配，可燃材料不得直接安装在发热用电器具上。
第二十五条 对违反本办法规定的行为，由文物、规划、建设等行政主管部门根据有关法律、法规和规章的规定进行处罚。
第二十六条 本办法自公布之日起施行。
国家物价局关于废钢铁价格管理的几项规定
国家物价局
国家物价局关于废钢铁价格管理的几项规定
1987年6月11日，国家物价局
国家计委、国家经委计原［1986］2116号《关于改革废钢铁计划管理体制的通知》决定：“从一九八七年起，取消回收废钢铁的指令性计划，开放废钢铁市场，国家不再上调废钢铁。”加强废钢铁价格管理，稳定废钢铁价格，对稳定特种钢材、轻工市场和中小农具用材价格十分重要。根据国务院经济调节办公室的通知精神，经与有关部门研究，并征求了各地物价部门的意见，现对废钢铁价格管理作如下规定：
一、冶金、铁道两行业调拨的废钢铁以及中央外汇进口实行财政补贴的废钢铁，应严格执行现行废钢铁统一定价。
二、各地方从社会上收购、供应的废钢铁也应执行现行废钢铁统一定价，地方执行统一定价有困难的，可由省、自治区、直辖市物价部门在打紧费用基础上，按不超过统一定价20％的幅度内核定地方临时价格，并报国家物价局备案。
三、各地区、各企业不得以废钢铁价格提高为由，擅自调整国家统配钢铁产品的价格。物价检查部门要严格进行监督、检查。
四、各地区、各部门在执行废钢铁价格时，存在哪些问题，请及时告我局。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.